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WORKER'S COMPENSATION: THIRD PARTY





THE APPEARANCE of worker's compensation systems
heralded a new day for the industrial worker. These sys-
tems now serve employees by guaranteeing to them a quick,
simple, effective, and relatively inexpensive means for ob-
taining compensation following a job-related injury.' Inherent
in the worker's compensation scheme, however, is the recogni-
tion that the no-fault benefits conferred upon the worker are
in lieu of damages that might be obtained in a common law
action and are neither designed nor intended to compensate
the injured employee fully for his injuries.' Unfortunately,
benefits have not kept pace with rising inflation, or even with
wages. One result has been an increase in the number of suits
brought by injured workers against third parties alleged to be
at fault." Predictably, the third party alleges that the em-
* J.D., University of Texas, 1973; M.B.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1962; B.S.E.E.,
Southern Methodist University, 1961. Member, Texas, Illinois and New York Bar.
** J.D., Southern Methodist University, 1981; M.A., Southwest Texas State Uni-
versity, 1976; B.A., University of Texas, 1973.
E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Frechette, 161 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1947)
(applying Minnesota law); Searcy v. Three Point Coal Co., 280 Ky. 683, 134 S.W.2d
228 (1939); Woolsey v. Panhandle Refining Co., 131 Tex. 449, 116 S.W.2d 675 (1938);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wright, 128 Tex. 242, 97 S.W.2d 171 (1936). See also
infra note 78.
1 James Stewart & Co. v. Law, 228 S.W.2d 601, 608 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco), affd,
149 Tex. 392, 233 S.W.2d 558 (1950); Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588,
158 P. 256 (1916).
3 In the past, many states required the injured worker to make an election between
worker's compensation benefits and third party litigation. By 1977, every state except
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ployer was responsible for all or part of the employee's injury
and seeks contribution and indemnity. In these instances, the
rights of the employee, employer, insurance carrier or state
fund," and the third party must all be balanced, a process that
has led to a wide variety of results in the courts.
Although courts have reached different results through bal-
ancing the parties' interests, there has been nearly uniform
agreement that the employee should not receive a double re-
covery, and considerable agreement that the employer or its
carrier should recover compensation payments made to the
employee if the employer is without fault. There is limited, if
any, agreement, however, regarding the rights of the third
party to recover from the employer who has contributed to
the injury. In this article we will examine the competing inter-
ests in third party actions in the worker's compensation set-
ting. We will advance an argument for the adoption of the
doctrine of comparative causation to determine the liability of
all parties and distribute the loss among them equitably,
whether they are situated within or without the worker's com-
pensation system. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to
examine both the common law and statutory underpinnings of
the contemporary worker's compensation system.
II. WORKER'S REMEDIES AT COMMON LAW
Prior to the enactment of worker's compensation laws, a
worker's sole remedy for injury was a common law action in
tort.' From start to finish, the worker's road to recovery was
one permitted the worker to pursue both remedies. J. CHELIUS, WORKPLACE SAFETY
AND HEALTH: THE ROLE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 27 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
CHELIUS].
4 In forty-four states, employers may purchase worker's compensation coverage
from private insurance carriers. In all but four states, employers may self-insure the
exposure if requisite financial responsibility is met. Eighteen states operate state
funds, but twelve of these allow competition from insurance carriers. Of the states
which bar private carriers, three allow eligible employers to self-insure. Private insur-
ance carriers are responsible for about 63 percent of all benefits paid, self-insurers for
14 percent, and state funds for 23 percent. J. BURTON, THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 33 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT].
6 Only the injured worker had a cause of action for his injuries. If he died, the
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long and arduous. First, the employee had to sue his em-
ployer, the man upon whom he depended for his bread; next,
his lawyer had to frame the complaint within the narrow
boundaries of the available forms of action. The employee
then had to persuade a reluctant fellow worker to testify in
court against their employer; and once in court, the employee
had the burden of proving his case while negating the em-
ployer's defenses. Even if a verdict was returned for the
worker, he was usually left with the barest of recoveries, so-
called "windfall" or "runaway" verdicts being virtually un-
known in rigidly conservative Victorian England and nine-
teenth century America.
To be sure, standard§ of conduct were imposed upon the
employer as well as the employee, but the burden of meeting
these standards fell most heavily on the latter. The employer's
basic duty was due care for his employee. In addition, he was
required to employ a sufficient number of qualified employees,
supply them with safe tools and equipment to perform the
tasks assigned, set out and enforce rules for the conduct of the
business, and warn of danger not readily apparent to the
workers.7 Nevertheless, an employer who failed to meet these
standards was usually able to cloak himself in that "unholy
trinity of defenses ' - contributory negligence, the fellow ser-
vant rule, and the assumption of risk doctrine.
The legal roots of the trinity are strong indeed. The doc-
trine of contributory negligence was first announced in But-
terfield v. Forrester.' In Butterfield, plaintiff and his horse
collided with a pole that defendant had placed across part of
the road to facilitate repairs he was making to his house
nearby. Although there was no evidence that plaintiff was in-
survivors had no cause of action for his death.
I A higher standard of care was imposed as the hazard inherent in the industry
increased, e.g., the railroad and mining industries.
Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
206, 225 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Larson].
s H. SOMERS AND A. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: PREVENTION, INSURANCE,
AND REHABILITATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY 18 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
SOMERS].
1 11 East. 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
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toxicated, the accident occurred soon after plaintiff left a pub-
lic house, and a witness testified that he "was riding vio-
lently." Further, the witness testified that the obstruction
could be seen from a distance of one hundred yards. Judge
Bayley instructed the jury that "if a person riding with rea-
sonable and ordinary care could have seen and avoided the
obstruction; and if they were satisfied that the plaintiff was
riding along the street extremely hard, and without ordinary
care, they should find a verdict for the defendant." 10 The jury
returned a defense verdict.
In 1837, the fellow servant or common employment doctrine
emerged in Priestly v. Fowler" as an exception to the long
established rule of the master's vicarious liability. In Priestly,
a boy sued his master, a butcher, for injury suffered when an
overloaded cart broke down.12 Upon proof that the breakdown
resulted from the negligence of a fellow servant, Lord Abinger
barred the butcher boy's recovery cataloguing with great
alarm the possible consequences if the case were decided for
the boy:
If the owner of the carriage is therefore responsible for the suf-
ficiency of his carriage to his servant, he is responsible for the
negligence of his coach-maker, or his harness-maker, or his
coachman. The footman, therefore, who rides behind the car-
riage, may have an action against his master for a defect in the
carriage owing to the negligence of the coach-maker, or for a
defect in the harness arising from the negligence of the har-
ness-maker, or for drunkenness, neglect, or want of skill in the
coachman; nor is there any reason why the principle should
not, if applicable in this class of cases, extend to many others.
The master, for example, would be liable to the servant for the
negligence of the chambermaid, for putting him into a damp
bed; for that of the upholsterer, for sending in a crazy bed-
stead, whereby he was made to fall down while asleep and in-
jure himself; for the negligence of the cook, in not properly
cleaning the copper vessels used in the kitchen: of the butcher,
in supplying the family with meat of a quality injurious to the
'I Id. at 60-61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
11 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837).
I Id. at 1-4, 150 Eng. Rep. at 1030-31.
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health; of the builder, for a defect in the foundation of the
house, whereby it fell, and injured both the master and the ser-
vant by the ruins."
Given the absence of cited authority in Lord Abinger's opin-
ion, one is free to speculate on the principles underlying the
doctrine. Commentators have advanced a variety of explana-
tions. Dodd, for example, suggests that the collective desire of
the judiciary to promote industrial expansion and success im-
pelled the decision. 14 Hanes believes that the decision was
bottomed upon a public policy desire to "avoid the imposition
of a crippling liability on the still young industrial revolu-
tion."'1 Downey notes the prevalent laissez-faire attitude at
the time." Levy has suggested that Lord Abinger's political
prejudices and party considerations affected his decision.'7 Fi-
nally, Larson's believes the real reason for the rule is best
stated in a later American decision which held that "consider-
ations of policy and general expediency" required it, and that
holding otherwise "would not conduce to the general good."'
Whatever the reasons, the decision was widely followed in
England and the United States for the next three-quarters of
a century.
The assumption of risk doctrine also developed from the
concepts found in the Priestly case. In that decison, with re-
markable insensitivity to the employment climate of the day,
Lord Abinger intoned that "[tihe servant is not bound to risk
his safety in the service of his master, and may, if he thinks
fit, cecline any service in which he reasonably apprehends in-
jury to himself; and in most of the cases in which danger may
be incurred, if not in all, he is just as likely to be acquainted
with the probability and extent of it as the master."20 One
13 Id. at 5-6, 150 Eng. Rep. at 1032.
14 W. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1936).
38 D. HANES, THE FIRST BRITISH COMPENSATION ACT, 1897 12 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as HANES].
' E. DOWNEY, HISTORY OF WORK ACCIDENT INDEMNITY IN IOWA (1912).
" 1 A. WILSON AND H. LEvY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 25 n.2 (1939).
Larson supra note 7, at 223.
"9 Farwell v. Boston & Worchester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49, 61 (4 Met. 49) (1842).
" Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032-33 (1837).
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need not be a keen student of nineteenth century English his-
tory to sense that the servant did not bargain at arm's length
with his master; that there was a dearth of jobs and a surfeit
of labor; and that the hazards and risks of railroad, mine, and
factory were not fully disclosed to the servant by the master.
Nevertheless, contributory negligence, the fellow servant rule,
and the assumption of risk were quickly imported to the
United States.
The contributory negligence doctrine of Butterfield was
adopted by the Vermont court in Robinson v. Cone. 1 Citing
Butterfield, the court held that "[o]ne person being in fault
will not dispense with another's using ordinary care for him-
self."'22 The fellow-servant rule and assumption of risk doc-
trine of Priestly became firmly implanted in American juris-
prudence with Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in Farwell v.
Boston and Worcester R.R. Corp.' In Farwell, a railroad was
held immune from liability to its locomotive engineer who suf-
fered the loss of a hand in an accident caused by the negli-
gence of its switchman.' The decision was cited widely in the
United States, and as if in a judicial exchange for Priestly,
was cited by many English courts as well.
The assumption of risk doctrine enjoyed undiminished vi-
tality in the workplace nearly a century after Priestly. For ex-
ample, the court in Wager v. White Star Candy Co.,'5 on par-
ticularly egregious facts, denied recovery by a girl who
contracted tuberculosis as a result of working in a candy com-
pany's damp, unsanitary, and unventilated cellar, stating:
The plaintiff was fully aware of the conditions under which she
worked, and continued in the employment from June to De-
cember in spite of such knowledge. It is from her testimony
that we learn that the walls of the cellar were wet to the touch;
that a cesspool backed up liquids which wet the floor; that the
cellar was devoid of windows to light or air it; that dead rats
22 Vt. 213 (1850).
Id. at 221 (citing Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 60-61, 103 Eng. Rep. 926,
927 (1809)).
45 Mass. 49 (4 Met. 49) (1842).
I4 /d.
" 217 A.D. 316, 217 N.Y.S. 173 (1926).
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were left about; that the odors were vile; that no fires were
kept in the upstairs room; that the plaintiff worked in a drafty
place; that the upstairs room was damp. It is common knowl-
edge that such conditions are deleterious to health. The plain-
tiff was chargeable with such knowledge. We think that the
plaintiff, as a matter of law, assumed the risk attendant upon
her remaining in the employment, and that the recovery may
not stand.26
Notwithstanding decisions such as Farwell, Robinson and
Wager, some judicial amelioration of the common law was al-
ready occurring. Larson notes that the principal modification
of the common law defenses was the adoption of the "vice-
principal" exception to the fellow-servant rule."' Under the
exception, certain common law duties of the employer were
held to be non-delegable duties; e.g., the duties to provide
tools and competent workmen, the duty to warn against
hazards, and the like. Additionally, a foreman responsible for
discharging his employer's non-delegable duties was excluded
from the fellow-servant category. Thus, an action by an em-
ployee against a foreman for negligence in discharging the em-
ployer's duties would not be barred from the fellow-servant
rule. This limited exception was adopted in some jurisdic-
tions. More commonly, however, the "vice-principal" excep-
tion was broadly construed to exclude all employees responsi-
ble for discharging the employer's non-delegable duties from
the fellow-servant category. The second judicial undercutting
occurred in cases holding that the employee did not assume
the risk of his employer's violation of a safety statute. Finally,
the courts in three states limited the defense of contributory
negligence solely to the mitigation of damages. Nevertheless,
the concept of no liability without fault permeated the law to
such an extent that the majority of judicial decisions contin-
ued to hold against the worker. Unfortunately, even as the toll
of adverse judicial decisions was rising arithmetically, the toll
of death and physical injuries was soaring geometrically. The
mounting injuries coupled with constant defeat in the courts
" 217 N.Y.S. at 175.
" Larson, supra note 7, at 225-26.
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impelled the workers to lay their demands for redress directly
at the feet of the lawmakers.
III. STATUTORY MOVEMENT TOWARD WORKER'S
COMPENSATION
A. European Beginnings
The first legislative adoption of a form of worker's compen-
sation occurred in Prussia, in 1838," with the passage of a
statute making the railroads liable to employees as well as
passengers for all accidents unless caused by the person in-
jured or by an act of God. In 1854, another statute was en-
acted requiring participation by certain classes of employers
in local "sickness associations. '"' 9 The modern worker's com-
pensation system appeared on July 6, 1884,80 with the enact-
ment of various provisions in the Compensation Bill intro-
duced in the Reichstag by Bismarck"1 in 1881. Although its
introduction was motivated in part by altruism and the collec-
tive urging of the social philosophers of the day,3 ' the bill
largely was intended to blunt the electoral successes of the
growing Marxist movement.33 The plan required employee as
well as employer contribution to a sickness and accident fund
administered by representatives of each group under central
government supervision." "In short, [it] was a compulsory
system based upon mutual association."85 The impact of Bis-
marck's bill can be measured by the fact that a worker's com-
2* C. WILLIAMS, JR. & P. BARTH, COMPENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 15
(1973) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM].
81 FOURTH SPECIAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF LABOR OF THE UNITED STATES
35 (1893) [hereinafter cited as FOURTH SPECIAL REPORT].
" Larson, supra note 7, at 229.
" Prince Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck, First Chancellor of the German Em-
pire, 1871-1890; known as the "Iron Chancellor."
3' The principal philosophers being Lassalle, Sismondi, Winkelblech, Wagner and
Schaeffle. See FOURTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 20-26.
Larson, supra note 7, at 229.
a' Today, East Germany has a social insurance system that is essentially the same
as the original system, which required contributions by employer and employee. The
West German system is compulsory and is funded exclusively by employer contribu-
tions to a semiprivate insurance carrier. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 28, at 15.
06 Id.
WORKER'S COMPENSATION
pensation system was adopted by every European nation
within the next quarter-century6
B. British Legislation87
Great Britain took its first hesitant step toward a worker's
compensation system with the passage of the Employer's Lia-
bility Act by Parliament in 1880."8 Unlike Germany, the moti-
vation for passage of the Act was neither altruism nor a seri-
ous Marxist threat, but rather the demands of the working
class of England who rose united in protest against the harsh-
ness of the common law. Although the Act was a step forward,
it did little more than return the worker to the same position
enjoyed by a stranger who was injured by the negligence of
the employer or his employees.'
By 1880, many British workers had formed "friendly socie-
ties,"' 0 which bore a resemblance to the sickness associations
in Germany. These "societies" were compensation insurance
pools that provided funds, irrespective of fault, to the injured
worker or his dependents in the event of death or disability.4
The uncertainties of exposure to liability following passage of
the Employer's Liability Act in 1880 prompted many employ-
ers to make contributions to the friendly societies, but the
quid pro quo exacted was the forbearance of the worker's
right to institute a suit under the Act.42 The act of forbear-
ance became known as "contracting out."'
In Griffiths v. Earl of Dudley" the "right" of a worker to
contract outside of the Act was upheld.' The "victory" by the
U Id. at 29.
'T For an excellent discussion of the evolution of the British system through the
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897, see HANES, supra note 15.
Employer's Liability Act, 1880, 43 & 44 Vict., ch. 42 (sometimes referred to as
the Gladstone Act, after William E. Gladstone, British Prime Minister, 1868-1874,
1880-1885; 1886; 1892-1894).
" More will be said later of the common law's inequities, inadequacies, and
inconsistencies.
41 HANES, supra note 15, at 22.
41 Id.
, Id. at 23.
43 Id.
4 9 Q.B.D. 357 (1881).
45 Id.
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British worker, however, was a hollow one as an action under
the Act held little promise of succor to the injured worker. For
example, in 1890, 389 cases were tried under the Employer's
Liability Act, of which 208 resulted in plaintiff's verdicts for
an average of 41 pounds per case.4 As with a suit at common
law, the worker usually obtained only the barest recovery for
his trouble, and was left doubly disadvantaged by his injury
and the enmity of his employer whom he sued under the Act.
Accordingly, the British worker's preference for the friendly
societies over an action under the Act and his growing attrac-
tion to the notion of compensation without fault are readily
understandable.
By 1892, both Liberals and Conservatives were committed
to a modification of the Employer's Liability Act.47 In Febru-
ary, 1893, an expanded employer's liability bill was introduced
in the House of Commons, 8 but the bill failed."e Following
the failure, the energies of the bill's supporters turned to pas-
sage of a worker's compensation plan.50 The people demanded
it; the government had promised it;51 and ultimately, it was
delivered in the Workman's Compensation Act of 1897.51 Pas-
sage of the Act was a public affirmation of the theory that the
cost of industrial injuries should be borne by the master
through the cost of his product in order to distribute more
equitably the burdens imposed by the hazards inherent in an
industrial society. In short, in a phrase widely ascribed to
Lloyd George," "[tihe cost of the product should bear the
blood of the workingman."
The Act differed from the German and continental schemes
in that the plan was elective; its administration was vested in
the courts; and insurance for its benefit payments was placed
16 HANES, supra note 15, at024-25.
17 Id. at 57.
48 Id.
'9 For a thorough examination of the reasons for the bill's failure, see HANES, supra
note 15, ch. 5.
• Id. at 87.
" Id. at 106.
W2 orkman's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., ch. 37.
David Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, 1916-1922.
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in the private sector.5 4 Although limited to certain industries,
in the industries in which it applied, the Act required the em-
ployer to pay for all accidents resulting in more than two
weeks disability, except those involving the willful misconduct
of the injured worker." The Act was extended by amendment
in 1906 to include all workers except casual and out-workers."
Further serious scrutiny of the underlying philosophy of the
worker's compensation system was undertaken in 1920 by the
Holman-Gregory Committee.57 The Committee concluded
that the voluntary system of private enterprise compensation
should not be replaced by a compulsory state scheme. By
1946, however, the philosophy of both the government and
workers had changed sufficiently to compel the enactment of
the National Insurance Act. 8 The Act removed control of
worker's compensation from the insurance companies and pri-
vate agencies and placed it in the hands of the government.5'
In 1965, by legislation enacted closely resembling Bismarck's
original German plan, coverage was extended to all workers.
Today, contributions to the fund are made equally by the em-
ployee and employer, with the government also making a
small contribution.6
0
C. United States Progress
The first American employer's liability statute, enacted in
Georgia in 1855, abolished the fellow servant rule in the rail-
road industry. 1 Even though many of the states that soon fol-
lowed Georgia's legislative lead broadened the application of
their statutes, none abrogated all three of the employer's de-
fenses for every employer-employee relationship.2 By 1907,
twenty-six states had employer liability acts.6 8 Most acts abro-
64 SOMERS, supra note 8, at 30.
COMPENDIUM, supra note 28, at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
67 Id.
" National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, ch. 62.
" COMPENDIUM, supra note 28, at 16.
60 Id.
61 1855 Ga. Laws. 155.
"' COMPENDIUM, supra note 28, at 13.
63 Id.
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gated the fellow servant rule, and some modified or limited
the contributory negligence and assumption of risk
doctrines."
The first meaningful federal legislation was enacted under
the leadership of President Theodore Roosevelt. The Federal
Employers' Liability Act of 1908 (FELA), 5 provided coverage
to all employees of common carriers engaged in interstate and
foreign commerce. For all of the benefits the Act brought to
the covered workers, its real value was the widespread atten-
tion it generated in state legislatures throughout the country
on the plight of the workers. The celebrated Pittsburgh Sur-
vey, in 1909,66 was the most forceful portrayal of the condi-
tions under which some Americans labored. The opening sen-
tence of the Survey recites the grim fact that 526 men were
killed in work accidents in Allegheny County from July 1,
1906, to June 30, 1907. In one three-month period, another
509 were injured. In a single county, the loss of life and limb
reached levels not recorded in a like time span even during
modern war. The publication of the Survey, along with the
stories and expos6s appearing in the popular press of the day,
did much to galvanize public opinion against the industrial
slaughter that was taking place without surcease throughout
the land.
In response to public demand for solutions and with the re-
alization that the employer liability acts had done little to
stem the tide of industrial accidents, state and federal com-
missions were formed throughout the country to investigate
the problems and recommend solutions. 7 The findings of the
commissions can generally be summarized as follows:68
1. An overwhelming percentage of industrial accidents
64 Id.
6- 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (West 1972).
68 C. EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW (1910).
67 SOMERS, supra note 8, at 22. By 1910, commissions were created by the legisla-
tures of Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Connecticut, Ohio, Illinois, Wiscon-
sin, Montana and Washington. Ultimately, forty investigative commissions in thirty-
two jurisdictions were appointed. Id.
68 Id. at 22-26 (construing W. DODD, ADMINISTATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
19-26 (1936)).
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were caused by hazards inherent in the occupation;
2. Legal actions by workers produced few victories; in
those few, the awards were penurious;
3. A worker or his family was compensated, if at all, many
years after the injury as a consequence of the delays occa-
sioned by the slow moving legal process;
4. The liability protection purchased by the employer was
burdened excessively by the cost of attorneys, claimsmen, ad-
ministrative costs, and profit to the insurance company. After
these costs were subtracted from the premiums paid, there
was pitifully little left to compensate the worker;
5. The range of awards varied so widely from case to case
that it was impossible to predict the amount of an award even
upon similar facts;
6. Injured workers or families who received little or no
compensation frequently became public charges or were
forced to seek private relief from religious organizations, rela-
tives, or friends;
7. The requirement that a worker sue his employer fre-
quently necessitated the testimony of a fellow worker, which
greatly exacerbated the tension and unrest that already ex-
isted throughout industry.
Based upon these findings, the commissions recommended
the enactment of compensation legislation premised on the
concept of liability without fault. 9 Although there was by no
means a universal consensus among the commissions on each
and every element to be included in the bill, it is fair to say
that the commissions uniformly recommended that a worker's
compensation law, in substance, should:70
1. provide sure, prompt, and reasonable income and medi-
cal benefits to work-accident victims or income benefits to
their dependents, regardless of fault;7 1
" SOMERS, supra note 8, at 22.
70 UNITED STATES CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION
LAWS vii (1980) [hereinafter cited as Chambers of Commerce]. For other formula-
tions, see generally CHELIUS, supra note 3, ch. 1; COMPENDIUM, supra note 28, ch. 3;
REPORT, supra note 4, at 35; SOMERS, supra note 8, ch. 2.
7' See Pacific Freight Lines v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 26 Cal. 2d 234, 157
P.2d 634 (1945); Vanadium Corp. of America v. Sargent, 134 Colo. 555, 307 P.2d 454
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2. provide a single remedy and reduce court delays, costs,
and work loads arising out of personal injury litigation;7 2
3. relieve public and private charities of financial
drains-incident to uncompensated industrial accidents;
4. eliminate payment of fees to lawyers and witnesses as
well as time-consuming trials and appeals;73
5. encourage maximum employer interest in safety and re-
habilitation through an appropriate experience-rating mecha-
nism [that provides for proper cost allocation]; and
6. promote frank study of causes of accidents (rather than
concealment of fault)-reducing preventable accidents and
human suffering.
State legislatures responded without delay. In 1909, Mon-
tana enacted a worker's compensation act, although it was
limited to coal mining.7' By 1910, the American Federation of
Labor, concerned about the shockingly high death and injury
figures in the new century, abandoned attempts to strengthen
employer liability laws in favor of worker's compensation leg-
islation.75 Surprisingly, a poll of manufacturers conducted by
the National Association of Manufacturers revealed a "very
large majority to be in favor of compensation legislation, '7
and in 1910, the Association openly endorsed workers com-
pensation.7 7 With labor and management thus aligned, addi-
tional legislative action was to be forthcoming shortly. New
York enacted the first worker's compensation act of general
application in the same year;78 however, the legislative re-
sponse to public demand for worker's compensation laws was
dealt a severe, albeit temporary, blow on constitutional
grounds by the judiciary. In Ives v. South Buffalo Railway
(1957); Woolsey v. Panhandle Refining Co., 131 Tex. 449, 116 S.W.2d 675 (1938).
71 See Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 158 P. 256 (1916).
73 Id.
71 1909 Mont. Laws, ch. 67.
75 SOMERS, supra note 8, at 31.
76 Id.
71 COMPENDIUM, supra note 28, at 17.
78 1910 N.Y. Laws ch. 674.
70 The Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Act passed in 1911 was the first to sur-
vive the initial constitutional challenge. In addition to Wisconsin, the following states
passed worker's compensation legislation in 1911: California, Illinois, Kansas, Massa-
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Co.,80 the New York Court of Appeals branded the Act
"plainly revolutionary" and held that it violated the due pro-
cess clause of the New York and federal constitutions.8 "
In the wake of the Ives decision, New York and six states"2
amended their constitutions. Nevertheless, Ives unquestion-
ably influenced the path of future legislation. In 1911, nine
states sought to write around Ives by passing non-compulsory
laws that permitted employees to "elect" whether to partici-
pate in the worker's compensation system.8" Of those states,
only Washington enacted a compulsory statute. In the consti-
tutional challenge that followed the passage of the Act, the
Washington Supreme Court expressly rejected Ives and up-
held the statute as a valid exercise of the police power of the
state."' By 1915, thirty states had enacted worker's compensa-
tion laws.
The lingering issue of constitutionality was finally put to
rest by the United States Supreme Court in 1917 in a trilogy
of cases that upheld the New York compulsory law,"5 the Iowa
elective laws' and the Washington exclusive state insurance
fund. 87 In each case, the Court held that the police power of
the state was paramount, and the acts were not violative of
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Thus the constitutionality of compensa-
tion without fault was finally given the nation's highest judi-
cial sanction, although the battle was not without cost as
authors of one work have observed:
When the Supreme Court finally ruled on the second New
York compulsory law, it was clear that the destructive evasions
of the elective law had been unnecessary. But by then it was
chusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio and Washington. W. SCHNEI-
DER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 9, at 24 n.4 (1941).
80 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
94 N.E. at 436, 440.
" Arizona, California, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Wyoming.
'3 Additionally, some states limited coverage to "hazardous" employments because
of the uncertainty over how far coverage could be extended constitutionally.
84 Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 158 P. 256 (1916).
" New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
s6 Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917).
' Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
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too late. Elective laws have become institutionalized dead-
weights on the compensation program and they have proved
remarkably resistant to alteration."8
By 1920, all but six states had passed worker's compensa-
tion legislation. With the passage of legislation by Mississippi
in 1948, each of the forty-eight states had a worker's compen-
sation law.8 Today, every American jurisdiction including
American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands has a worker's compensation law.'0 In addition, United
States Government employees are covered under the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act l and various maritime workers
are covered under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act.'2 By one estimate, more than eighty-seven
percent of the entire labor force in the United States is cov-
ered by worker's compensation laws.'8
How successfully the objectives of worker's compensation
have been achieved over the past sixty to seventy years and
whether reform is needed are subject to debate. Two recent
studies have provided a forum for such discussions. In 1972,
the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation
Laws made eighty-four recommendations for improvement,
nineteen of which were termed "essential";" nevertheless, the
Commission concluded that the system was fundamentally
sound. Some recommendations have been adopted by various
states. In 1976, the Inter-Agency Workers Compensation Task
Force, comprised of representatives of several federal govern-
ment agencies, recommended more "effective management at
the state level, with the federal government monitoring prog-
ress and providing technical assistance."'" Interestingly, both
88 SOMERS, supra note 8, at 33.
I d. at 34.
" Each of the Canadian provinces and territories also has a compensation act or
ordinance. CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE, supra note 70, at vii.
9- 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 8101-8193 (West 1980).
" 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-950 (West 1978).
" CHELIUS, supra note 3, at 20.
" REPORT, supra note 4, at 45-52.
CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE, supra note 70, at vii.
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the National Commission9 6 and the Task Forcee9 rejected re-
placement of the state systems by a single federal program,
although bills requiring federally mandated minimum stan-
dards for benefits had been introduced in Congress in the
past."
IV. THIRD PARTY ACTIONS
To understand fully third party actions in a worker's com-
pensation setting, it is necessary to focus on the relationship
between the employer and employee and briefly review the
history and development of the doctrines of contribution and
indemnity. At the inception of the employer-employee rela-
tionship, i.e. when the worker is hired, the employee, in some
states, may elect to retain his right to common law remedies
against the employer." Usually, he does not retain the right,
and it is thereby waived by statute if the employer subscribes
to the worker's compensation system. 00 Conversely, there is
no waiver if the employer is required but fails to subscribe to
the worker's compensation plan, or if the employee expressly
retains his common law rights.'0' If the employer has sub-
scribed to the worker's compensation plan'02 and the em-
" REPORT, supra note 4, at 26, 129-30.
CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE, supra note 70, at vii.
, Id. To date, however, none has progressed beyond the committee level.
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 28 (1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 24
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 § 3a (Vernon 1967)
(notice of intention by employee to waive worker's compensation benefits and retain
common law rights against the employer must be given to the employer in writing at
the time the employee is hired).
1' See supra note 99.
101 In those jurisdictions that permit a worker to retain his common law right to
bring suit against the employer, the waiver of the right should be based on more than
the worker's failure to give the requisite statutory written notice. In today's industri-
alized society, it is neither realistic nor equitable to expect a worker to be indepen-
dently aware of the notice he must give in order to retain his common law right. It
may be argued, however, that the average worker cannot intelligently make a decision
whether a waiver would be in his family's best interest by virtue of his lack of under-
standing of the common law right and/or worker's compensation benefits. Neverthe-
less, legislative reform in those states should include a requirement for a subscribing
employer to provide the employee with notice of his right to accept the potential
worker's compensation benefits or to retain the right to sue the employer for damages
arising out of an employment-related injury.
102 Only New Jersey, South Carolina, and Texas have elective systems. CHAMBERS
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ployee has waived his common law remedy, a contract arises
between the two parties limiting the worker's compensation to
the benefits prescribed under the plan.
Today, most American jurisdictions make no provision for
the employee's retention of common law rights but do make
employer participation in the worker's compensation system
compulsory. In short, as against the employer, the employee's
exclusive remedy is worker's compensation. It is clear, how-
ever, that whether the relationship between the employer and
employee is contractual or statutory, it cannot cut off the
rights of a third party.103 It is the definition and application of
these "rights" that have given courts difficulty.
Contribution is an equitable doctrine which permits the
burden of a loss, for which multiple defendants were equally
and unintentionally responsible, to be jointly shared.'" The
case of Merryweather v. Nixan'0 5 is generally credited with
the creation of the doctrine,10 6 but the court, relying on the
maxim "in pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis
[defendentis],',a0 refused to allow contribution between inten-
tional joint tortfeasors.'0 8 The .language of the opinion was
broad, but widely followed, particularly in the United States,
where courts made no effort to distinguish between inten-
tional and negligent conduct, but instead slavishly repeated
that the law should not come to the aid of wrongdoers in ad-
justing losses between themselves. 09
With each repetition of the rule, however, the courts be-
OF COMMERCE, supra note 70, at 3-4.
103 Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. 1964).
'04 See Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 63
Ariz. 352, 162 P.2d 609 (1945); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Century Indem.
Co., 78 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1935, writ dism'd).
108 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng, Rep. 1337 (1799). See Note, Contribution Between
Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence - Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV.
176 (1898).
',o W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 305-06 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER).
101 "Where the fault is mutual, the law will leave the case as it finds it." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979).
108 8 Term Rep. at 186, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1338.
o' See, e.g., Berkson v. Kansas City Cable Ry. Co., 144 Mo. 211, 45 S.W. 1119,
1120 (1898).
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came increasingly uncomfortable with it. So, too, did the legis-
latures, and eventually the doctrine began to falter.'10 It ulti-
mately fell because of the inequities inherent in a system that
permitted the entire loss to be borne by one tortfeasor where
two or more were responsible. As Professor Prosser had urged,
the allocation of loss should not be determined by the "acci-
dent of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability
insurance, the plaintiff's whim or spite, or his collusion with
the other wrongdoer. . .. " In short, the rule was not fair.
By 1980, nineteen states had adopted the Uniform Contri-
bution Among Tortfeasors Act"' or a version of it. In some
states the initial adoption was judicial and preceded legisla-
tive codification; in all states the force behind its adoption has
been the goal of equitable apportionment of loss.
Indemnity, like contribution, has long been a part of the
common law,' " finding its roots in equity.'" Unlike contribu-
tion, however, indemnity permits the shifting of the entire
loss from one tortfeasor to another who is also jointly and sev-
erally liable to the plaintiff. It is the payment of all of plain-
tiff's damages by one tortfeasor to another tortfeasor who has
paid the plaintiff. Contribution has always meant "some"; and
indemnity has always meant "all." Nevertheless, the differ-
ence between contribution and indemnity is arguably one of
"I See generally Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U.
PA. L. REv. 130, 137-46 (1932).
'" PROSSER, supra note 106, § 50, at 307.
"' UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT, 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1981).
x, In Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799), the
court expressly disclaimed any effect its decision might have on traditional "cases of
indemnity". Id.
114
The duty to indemnify may arise, and indemnity may be allowed in
those fact situations where in equity and good conscience the burden
of the judgment should be shifted from the shoulders of the person
seeking indemnity to the one from whom indemnity is sought. The
right depends upon the principle that everyone is responsible for the
consequences of his own wrong, and if others have been compelled to
pay damages which ought to have been paid by the wrongdoer, they
may recover from him. Thus, the determination of whether or not in-
demnity should be allowed must of necessity depend upon the facts of
each case.
Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (1964).
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degree. Judge Learned Hand perhaps said it best: "[I]ndemity
is only an extreme form of contribution."' 15 Defining indem-
nity is easy enough; applying it is a more difficult task.
In Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia,"1 6 the
United States Supreme Court permitted "equitable indem-
nity" where the conduct was unintentional stating that: "it is
not against the policy of the law to inquire into the relative
delinquency of the parties, and to administer justice between
them, although both parties are wrongdoers."1 7 Since Wash-
ington Gaslight, courts have long struggled with the process
of administering justice between the parties. In determining
whether one is entitled to "all" or "nothing" from a joint
tortfeasor, courts frequently have applied legal litmus tests la-
beled "active-passive," ' s "primary-secondary," 19 or "direct-
indirect" to the conduct of the party seeking indemnity. Al-
though the tests continue to enjoy some currency in the legal
lexicon, the "all" or "nothing" result has caused some courts
to question seriously whether it is the test or the result that
should be changed. 120 Called into close examination is the
fairness of shifting the entire loss to one whose culpability is
only marginally greater than that of another.
The response in some cases has been a judicial evolution of
the venerable equitable indemnity doctrine into an equitable
sharing of the loss. Whether the approach is called "partial
indemnity,"'' "comparative indemnity"' 2' or "comparative
'I Slattery v. Marra Bros., Inc., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1951).
se 161 U.S. 316 (1896).
117 Id. at 328.
I" See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Lan Franco, 267 Cal. App. 2d 881, 886,
73 Cal. Rptr. 660, 664 (1968). See also Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent
Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IowA L. Rav. 517, 539 (1952); Leflar, Contri-
bution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. Rav. 130, 156 (1932).
I" See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Lan Franco, 267 Cal. App. 2d 881, 886,
73 Cal. Rptr. 660, 664 (1968). See also PROSSR, supra note 106, § 51 at 312.
120 American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 594-95, 578 P.2d
899, 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 192 (1978); Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Whitehead &
Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 472 (Mo. 1978); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143,
148-49, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387-88 (1972).
"' American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 591, 578 P.2d 899,
907, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 190 (1978); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 148, 282
N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972).
li' American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 598, 578 P.2d 899,
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partial indemnity,' 12 3 the result is a distribution of the loss in
direct proportion to the respective fault of the joint
tortfeasors. It is a judicial sleight-of-hand; it is contribution in
indemnity's clothing. Nevertheless, the apportionment of loss
on the basis of relative fault is fundamentally fair.
Faithful to the exclusive remedy doctrine of worker's com-
pensation, 24 a majority of American jurisdictions have not
permitted a third party who has been sued by an injured em-
ployee to seek contribution or indemnification from a negli-
gent employer. 121 The courts have reached this result by a va-
riety of avenues. Some have advanced a definitional rubric. By
definition, contribution requires that joint tortfeasors have a
common liability to the plaintiff. Under the worker's compen-
sation system, the employer's liability to the employee is stat-
utory, not tortious. Therefore, some courts have held that the
employer is not, by definition, a joint tortfeasor."' Other
courts have held that an employer who has subscribed to its
state worker's compensation plan and relied upon the exclu-
sive remedy section of the statute should have his justified ex-
912, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 195 (1978). See also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21
Cal. 3d 322, 328, 579 P.2d 441, 444, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 553 (1978) (supporting the
holding in American Motorcycle Ass'n allowing comparative indemnity).
"I American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. 3d
578, 599, 578 P.2d 899, 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 195 (1978).
" See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-103 (1980);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6
(Burns 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (1973); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 24
(Michie/Law Co-op 1976); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 418.131 (1981); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 176.031 (West 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1 (West 1959); N.Y. WORK.
COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 51 (Purdon 1952); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 102.03 (West 1973).
"I See, e.g., E. B. Wills Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 650, 128 Cal. Rptr.
541 (1976); Georgia Power Co. v. Diamond, 130 Ga. App. 268, 202 S.E.2d 704 (1973);
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Westerlind, 374 Mass. 569, 373 N.E.2d 957 (1978); Husted
v. Consumers Power Co., 376 Mich. 41, 135 N.W.2d 370 (1965); Arcell v. Ashland
Chem. Co. 152 N.J. Super. 471, 378 A.2d 53 (1977); Bankers Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cleve-
land Hardware & Forging Co., 77 Ohio App. 121, 62 N.E.2d 180, appeal dism'd, 145
Ohio St. 614, 62 N.E.2d 251 (1945); Arnold v. Borbonus, 257 Pa. Super. 110, 390 A.2d
271 (1978); City of Beaumont v. Graham, 441 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 1969); A. 0. Smith
Corp. v. Associated Sales & Bag Co., 16 Wis. 2d 145, 113 N.W.2d 562 (1962).
"' See generally Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson Aircraft Tire Corp.,
353 So.2d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd per curiam, 382 So. 2d 878 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (following Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla.
1979); 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.21 (1976).
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pectation of limited and determinate liability upheld.1 27 Some
courts have fastened upon both rationales in upholding the
exclusive remedy doctrine.
The rigidity of these approaches has produced, however, in-
equitable results where the employer's negligence has contrib-
uted to the employee's injury.12 8 In response, courts have
looked to other rationales to overcome an inequitable result. A
Pennsylvania court simply disregarded the traditional defini-
tion of joint tortfeasors, defining the term instead as parties
whose conduct, considered in concert, caused the plaintiff's
injuries."12 A narrow construction of the worker's compensa-
tion statute under the doctrine of ejusdem generis may some-
times permit a third party to proceed against the employer.
For example, the Alaska statute80 provides that worker's
compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy against the
employer by the "employee, his legal representatives, husband
or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone other-
wise entitled to recover damages from the employer."1831 Con-
struction under the doctrine limits that application of the
statute solely to the specific class of persons enumerated;
thus, "anyone" such as a third party would not be precluded
from seeking contribution or indemnity."' In Newport Air
Park, Inc. v. United States," "' a federal district court nar-
rowly construed language in the Federal Employees' Compen-
sation Act,"'8 which is essentially the same as that in the
Alaska statute. 85 The court limited the scope of the statute's
"' Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
IU Davis, Third-Party Tortfeasors' Rights Where Compensation Covered Employ-
ers are Negligent - Where do Dole and Sunspan Lead? 3 WORKMEN'S COMP. L. REv.
1 (1976)[hereinafter cited as Davis].
"I Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 216 A.2d 318 (1966).
180 ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1972).
Id.
"' Ejusdem generis is a doctrine of construction and interpretation of statutes,
wills, etc. Basically, where general words follow a specific enumeration, the general
language is construed as applying to that class of persons or things of the kind specif-
ically mentioned. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (5th ed. 1979).
I' 293 F. Supp. 809 (D.R.I. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cir.
1969).
" 5 U.S.C.A. § 8116(c) (West 1980).
" See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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exclusive remedy provision to the class of persons named in
the statute or to others similarly situated.' " Nevertheless,
other courts construing the same statute have held
otherwise.1 37
Some courts that have declined to permit third party ac-
tions against the employer in the cases then before them have
discussed circumstances where an action would be allowed.
For example, a third party action will be allowed if a contract
between the third party and the employer provides for indem-
nification to the former.'38 Learned Hand summarized the
rule as follows:
[W]e shall assume that, when the indemnitor and indemnitee
are both liable to the injured person, it is the law of New
Jersey that, regardless of any other relation between them, the
difference in gravity of their faults may be great enough to
throw the whole loss upon one. We cannot, however, agree that
that result is rationally possible except upon the assumption
that both parties are liable to the same person for the joint
wrong. If so, when one of the two is not so liable, the right of
the other to indemnity must be found in rights and liabilities
arising out of some other legal transaction between the two. "
"' Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809, 812 (D.R.I. 1968)
vacated on other grounds, 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. 1969).
"I See, e.g., Christie v. Powder Power Tools Corp., 124 F. Supp. 693 (D.D.C. 1954),
where decedent, a civilain employee of the United States was killed in the course of
his employment. Pursuant to the Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §
8101 (West 1980), the United States paid death benefits to the decedent's estate, and
the administrator of the estate brought suit against the manufacturer of the tool
which discharged a metal pin, killing the decedent. The manufacturer sued the
United States for contribution and indemnity. Held: The manufacturer's action is
precluded by the exclusive remedy of the Act. Id. § 8116(c). See also Rhoades v.
United States, 216 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Cal. 1962), where decedents, passengers on a
commercial airliner, were employees of the United States and were killed in a colli-
sion between the commercial aircraft and a military airplane. The commercial airline
sued the United States, the latter having paid benefits under the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 8101 (West 1980), for contribution or indemnity.
Held: the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, section 8116(c), precluded the
action.
18 2A LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §76.41 (1976).
I" Slattery v. Marra Bros., Inc., 186 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951)(applying New
Jersey law).
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In Husted v. Consumers Power Co., 140 the Michigan Supreme
Court refused to allow a third party action against the plain-
tiff's employer for indemnity, but concluded:
We carefully avoid deciding that there cannot be, in any cir-
cumstances of noncontractual relationship between a sued de-
fendant and the plaintiff's employer, recovery over against the
employer .... An obligation to reimburse can be implied by
equitable principles, provided always the [third party] is with-
out personal fault.14'1
The court further noted that "[loss occasioned by vicarious
liability, there being no such personal fault of the one seeking
indemnity or reimbursement, is an example.' ' 4 2 Finally, in
Westfall v. Lorenzo Gin Co., 4 s a Texas appellate court reaf-
firmed the exclusivity of remedy provided by workmen's com-
pensation, but stated in dictum that a third party action for
contribution or indemnity could be maintained where the em-
ployer has been grossly negligent.14 4
Some courts have refused to write around the exclusive
remedy doctrine, preferring instead to meet the issue of equi-
table distribution of loss squarely. At least two jurisdictions
have allowed a defendant sued by an injured employee to re-
cover contribution from the plaintiff's employer. Illinois, a
contributory negligence jurisdiction until March, 1981,146 pro-
vides in its worker's compensation statute for an exclusive
remedy to the employee or "anyone otherwise entitled to re-
cover damages for such injury. ' " 6 Nevertheless, in Skinner v.
141 376 Mich. 41, 135 N.W.2d 370 (1965).
14 135 N.W.2d at 377.
", Id. See also Prosky v. National Acme Co., 404 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1975);
Saad v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 399 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (applying
Michigan Law)(Indemnity can be sought against the negligent employer where the
defendant can establish that he was free from personal fault, or passively negligent).
14 287 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1956, no writ).
4 Id. at 554.
:0 Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
" ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) states as follows:
(a) No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the
employer, his insurer, his broker, any service organization retained by
the employer, his insurer or his broker to provide safety service, advice
or recommendations for the employer or the agents or employees of
any of them for injury or death sustained by any employee while en-
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Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co.,14 the Illinois
Supreme Court allowed the defendant/manufacturer to seek
contribution from the employer.' 48
In Skinner, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of an injec-
tion moulding machine alleging that a defect in the device
caused her injury.'4 9 In turn, the manufacturer filed a third
party complaint against the plaintiff's employer seeking con-
tribution alleging misuse of the product.150 Because the manu-
facturer's third party complaint contained allegations that
product misuse contributed to plaintiff's injury and that the
employer assumed the risk of injury, the court held that the
manufacturer stated a cause of action for contribution.' 5' The
court stated succinctly that "[t]he fact that the employee's ac-
tion against the employer is barred by the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act . . . would not preclude the manufacturer's
third-party action against the employer for indemnification
...and'should not serve to bar its action for contribution."1
5 2
Minnesota, a comparative negligence jurisdiction, has taken
a conservative approach to contribution in a worker's compen-
sation setting. The Minnesota statute,'5 8 like that of Illinois,
provides for an exclusive remedy.5 4 Nevertheless, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court in Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp.,"' al-
gaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compen-
sation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by
the provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent
upon him, the legal representatives of his estate, or any one otherwise
entitled to recover damages for such injury.
Id.
'4' 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977).
148 374 N.E.2d at 443.
Id. at 438.
160 Id.
I: d. at 443.
56 Id.
153 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.031 (West 1966).
1I4 Id.
The liability of an employer prescribed by this chapter is exclusive
and in the place of any other liability to such employe [sic], his per-
sonal representative, surviving spouse, parent, any child, dependent,
next of kin, or other person entitled to recover damages on account of
such injury or death. .
Id.
155 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977).
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lowed a limited form of contribution by the manufacturer
against the employer."6 In Lambertson, the plaintiff brought
a products liability action against the manufacturer of a brake
press for injuries sustained when the press crushed his arm. 5 7
The manufacturer impleaded Lambertson's employer for con-
tribution. " ' At trial, the jury found the plaintiff to have con-
tributed fifteen percent to the cause of the accident, the man-
ufacturer twenty-five percent, and the employer sixty
percent.1 59 Further, it fixed the plaintiff's damages at
$40,000.110 The trial court awarded Lambertson $34,000, but
denied the manufacturer contribution from the employer.'61
The appellate court noted the interest of the manufacturer
in limiting its liability to the percentage of fault ascribed to it,
and that the methods of securing restitution and a fair appor-
tionment of damages are contribution and indemnity.'
Though the court recognized the equity inherent in contribu-
tion and the inequity in foisting the entire loss on the manu-
facturer where it has contributed only twenty-five percent to
the cause of the accident, the expectation of the employer in
limited liability could not be totally disregarded.'
Balancing the equities, the court allowed the manufacturer
to recover contribution from the employer up to the amount
of worker's compensation benefits'" and concluded:
This approach allows the third party [manufacturer] to obtain
limited contribution, but substantially preserves the em-
ployer's interest in not paying more than worker's compensa-
tion liability. While this approach may not allow full contribu-
tion recovery to the third party in all cases, it is the solution
we consider most consistent with fairness and the various stat-
utory schemes before us.' 6
"' 257 N.W.2d at 689.
" Id. at 682.
" Id. at 684.
'" Id. at 683.
G40 Id.
161 Id.
303 Id. at 685.
'" Id. at 688-89.
'" Id. at 689.
'6 Id. See also Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1974)(apply-
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In the much celebrated case' 66 of Dole v. Dow Chemical
Co.,' 67 a New York appellate court recognized that the New
York worker's compensation statute'68 provided an exclusive
remedy. '69 Nevertheless, the court held that, in a suit by the
widow of an employee against a third party manufacturer, the
manufacturer could implead the employer who was partially
responsible for the accident and recover an amount equal to
the employer's percentage share of fault.
17 0
The courts in Skinner, Lambertson, and Dole moved to-
ward the same objective: allowing the third party some mea-
sure of recovery against the negligent employer-searching, in
the language of the court in Skinner, for "better solutions."'
7 1
In the face of exclusive remedy statutes,17 2 the court in Skin-
ner allowed contribution based on proportional fault,'7' while
the Dole court permitted indemnity based on apportioned
fault.17 ' Nevertheless, whether clothed in terms of contribu-
ing Nevada law)(allowed contribution to the extent of worker's compensation
benefits).
See Davis, supra note 128, at 1 n.1.
167 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
369 30 N.Y.2d at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390. The statute provides:
The liability of an employer prescribed by the last preceding section
shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever, to
such employee, his personal representatives, spouse, parents, depen-
dents or next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages,
at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death ....
N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
170 30 N.Y.2d at 152-53, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390-91.
Florida's exclusive remedy statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.11 (West 1981), is not a
bar to a third party seeking indemnity from an employer, Sunspan Eng'g & Constr.
Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975), if the third party is
"vicariously, constructively, derivatively or technically liable" to the employer.
Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490, 492 (Fla. 1979). Nevertheless, a
third party may not seek contribution from an employer, because there is no common
liability to the plaintiff/employee. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson Aircraft
Tire Corp., 353 So. 2d 137, 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd per curiam, 382 So.
2d 878 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (following Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So.
2d 490 (Fla. 1979).
171 Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437,
438 (1977).
M See supra notes 146 and 168.
M70 Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437,
442-43 (1977).
17' Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 152-53, 282 N.E.2d 288, 294-95, 331
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tion or indemnity, the result is the same: the third party is
allowed to recover damages from the employer to the extent
of the employer's percentage of fault. The court in Lambert-
son, however, was more deferential to the traditional under-
pinnings of worker's compensation in its search for a "better
solution." Rather than totally disregarding the employer's ex-
pectation of limited exposure, the court sought a middle
ground, settling ultimately on a rule that permits contribution
up to the amount of worker's compensation benefits. 175
The Skinner-Dole approaches do violence to a basic pre-
mise of worker's compensation that, in return for the guaran-
teed payment of compensation benefits to an employee, the
employer justifiably expects liability that is both limited and
determinate.1' The Lambertson approach preserves intact
the employer's expectations, but it requires the third party
frequently to pay more than its percentage fault. With each of
these inequites in mind, we propose a system that not only
will uphold the justified expectations of the employer and em-
ployee, but also limit the liability of the third party to its per-
centage of fault.
V. THE CASE FOR COMPARATIVE CAUSATION
The Skinner, Dole, and Lambertson cases illustrate how
courts have wrestled with balancing the equities in employee-
employer-product manufacturer cases in the face of exclusive
remedy worker's compensation statutes. Cases frequently
arise, however, with additional variables. Therefore, we need a
system that can equitably resolve not only the Skinner-Dole
cases, but also cases involving negligent parties, intentional
tortfeasors, and parties who settle or become insolvent, before
or after trial.
We submit that the most equitable procedure for assessing
responsibility and distributing loss in an employee's action
against third parties is apportionment on the basis of compar-
N.Y.S.2d 382, 390-92 (1972).
Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679, 689 (1977).
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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ative causation. 177 Under comparative causation, the trier of
fact will determine the employee's damages and the percent-
age of the damages caused by each party, but the manner in
which each party bears his share of the damages differs as
follows:
1. A third party will bear only the percentage of the dam-
ages it caused;
2. A settling party will bear only the amount it chooses to
bear through settlement, regardless of the percentage of the
damages it caused;
3. An insolvent party will bear no share of the loss, regard-
less of the percentage of the damages it caused;
4. An employer will bear only the amount paid in worker's
compensation benefits, regardless of the percentage of the
damages it caused;
5. An employee will always recover the worker's compen-
sation benefits, regardless of the percentage of the damages
caused by himself. In addition, the employee will recover the
percentage of the damages caused by a solvent third party
and the amount accepted from a settling party. Simply stated,
the comparative causation approach requires each party to
bear its share of the employee's damages, but the manner in
which each party discharges the responsibility for its share of
the fault will vary.178 Prior to illustrating the application of
the comparative causation doctrine in hypothetical cases, we
will examine some decisions, statutes, and commentary that
clarify the doctrine.
77 See generally Davis, supra note 128, at 9. See also Murray v. United States, 405
F.2d 1361, 1365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1968)(while a defendant/third party, sued by the plain-
tiff/employee, may not sue a negligent employer for contribution, the common law
recovery of the employee should be reduced by fifty percent in view of the employer's
negligence and the worker's compensation relationship between the employee and
employer).
178 Under the comparative causation formulation, the liability of the parties to the
employee is several and not joint. Nevertheless, if the trier of fact determines that the
fault of two or more parties is coextensive, i.e., inseparable from the standpoint of
causation, then necessarily the liability as between or among these parties is joint and
several. For example, if two parties act in concert to injure the employee, liability is
joint and several as between the parties in concert. Additionally, where one is vicari-
ously liable for another's fault, the liability as between the party at fault and the
party vicariously liable is joint and several.
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At least one court to date has adopted comparative causa-
tion. In Barron v. United States,7 plaintiff sustained injury
while engaged in construction work at a naval shipyard and
brought suit, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Tort
Claims Act180 against the United States. The latter, in turn,
impleaded plaintiff's employer for contribution."' Although
the employer's negligence contributed to its employee's injury,
the employer was shielded by the exclusive remedy provision
of the Hawaii worker's compensation statute.1 82 Recognizing
this limitation on the United States to recover from the em-
ployer on its third party action, the federal district court said:
The logical, as well as the fair and reasonable, result is for the
Court to determine the percentage of fault attributable to the
government and apply the resulting percentage to the damages
sustained by plaintiff.
The principle of comparative fault among joint tortfeasors
and its use in fixing the amount of contribution is well estab-
lished. If comparative fault can be determined for purposes of
contribution, it can be determined as well to ascertain the pro-
portion of damage to be assessed against one of two tortfeasors
where the other has been immunized against liability. 81
A like approach has been espoused in Texas. The authors of
"Special Project-Texas Tort Law in Transition s18 4 note that
the employer and employee have voluntarily waived their
common law rights and remedies and have substituted in their
place the provisions of the worker's compensation statute.185
Therefore, when the conduct of the employer and third party
combine to produce the employee's injury, the third party
179 473 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Hawaii 1979), modified, 654 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1981).
ISO 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (West 1976).
473 F. Supp. at 1085.
183 Id. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 386-5 (1976).
183 473 F. Supp. at 1088. Cf. Sugue v. F. L. Smithe Mach. Co., 56 Hawaii 598, 546
P.2d 527 (1976)(comparative causation adopted by implication). The court rejected
the imposition of liability on a non party employer. Nevertheless, Barron holds that,
because of the exclusive remedy protection afforded the employer under Hawaiian
law, a third party plaintiff has no right of contribution from the employer. Therefore,
Sugue would seemingly allow a determination of the third party's percentage of fault.
184 Special Project, Texas Tort Law in Transition, 57 TEx. L. REV. 381 (1979).
'85 Id. at 441-42. See Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 507 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1974).
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should not be liable for that percentage of fault attributable
to the employer; rather, the Texas worker's compensation
statute' and comparative negligence statute18 7 should be
construed together, and the third party's liability should be
limited to his degree of fault.188 Thus, "[t]he . . . employer
should be treated procedurally like a 'settled but joined' party
under . . . [the comparative negligence statute] . . .; the im-
munity would act as 'a complete release of the portion of the
judgment attributable to . . . [the employer].' "189
Third party actions brought by injured employees often in-
volve products liability claims, thus injecting the additional
problem of strict liability into the lawsuit. 90 The question
therefore arises: in assessing the relative fault of the third-
party manufacturer and the employer, how should the trier of
fact balance the manufacturer's strict liability in tort and the
employer's negligence? We submit that the comparative cau-
sation approach easily accommodates the introduction of a
strict liability issue into the equation, because the focus of the
approach is on causation, so it matters not whether the em-
ployee's injury was caused by negligence or a defective prod-
uct. Some have argued that the balancing effort is a vain at-
tempt to compare "apples and oranges."'' Nevertheless, in
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 92 the California Supreme
Court found that the suggested problems were "more theoreti-
cal than practical" and noted that other jurisdictions have
186 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
181 Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
188 Special Project, Texas Tort Law in Transition, 57 Tax. L. REV. 381, 442 (1979).
189 Id.
"oI Pursuant to Section 402A of the American Law Institute's Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, now adopted in the majority of American jurisdictions, see Walkowiak,
Product Liability Litigation and the Concept of Defective Goods: "Reasonableness"
Revisited?, 44 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 705, 706-07 n.7 (1979), a manufacturer, having
designed, manufactured, or marketed an unreasonably dangerous product is strictly
liable to the consumer for injuries resulting from its use. See, e.g., McKisson v. Sales
Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Co., Inc. v. Tunks,
416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
191 See, e.g., Boone, Comparative Negligence: Solution or Problem?, 17 CAL. TRIAL
LAW J. 33 (1975); Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence:
The Collision of Fault and No Fault, 14 SAN DIEao L. REv. 337 (1977).
9 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
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found juries to be competent to compare effectively strict lia-
bility and negligence."9 3
In Nest-Kart, a case not involving worker's compensation,
the plaintiff was injured when a supermarket shopping cart
collapsed on her foot. 94 She sued the supermarket, the shop-
ping cart manufacturer, and a cart repairer on strict liability
and negligence theories."95 The defendants affirmatively
pleaded contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff."96
The jury found the plaintiff and the cart repairer free of
fault, the supermarket liable on strict liability and negligence
theories, and the manufacturer liable under strict liability.197
Further, it found that the supermarket and manufacturer
were eighty percent and twenty percent liable, respectively." 98
The supermarket, in turn, moved for contribution from the
manufacturer in the amount of thirty percent, which, if
awarded, would equalize the amount of contribution pro rata,
pursuant to the common law rule."' The trial court granted
the supermarket's motion.00
The issue ultimately presented on appeal was whether the
comparative fault doctrine announced in Li v. Yellow Cab
Co. °0 required an apportionment of damages between joint
tortfeasors found to be negligent and strictly liable.02 In re-
sponding affirmatively and reversing the trial court, the court
stated, "[e]ven when an injury was in part caused by a defec-
tive product, fairness and good social policy [dictate] a shar-
ing or apportionment of liability. 2 03 Moreover, the court
noted that the rule of strict products liability does not require
" Id. at 331, 579 P.2d at 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555. See generally Noble v. Desco
Shoe Corp., 41 A.D.2d 908, 343 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (1973); City of Franklin v. Badger
Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866, 871-73 (1973); Gies v. Nissin
Corp., 57 Wis. 2d 371, 204 N.W.2d 519, 526-27 (1973).
,'o 21 Cal. 3d at 325, 579 P.2d at 442, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
1o5 Id.
1 Id.
Id. at 326, 579 P.2d at 442, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
"9 Id.
Id. at 326, 579 P.2d at 443, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
000 Id. at 327, 579 P.2d at 443, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
,o 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
200 21 Cal. 3d at 325, 579 P.2d at 442, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
I03 d. at 329, 579 P.2d at 444, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
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that negligent tortfeasors escape liability.20 4
Practically, the jury can be instructed to assess the compar-
ative cause of the injury, taking into consideration all inde-
pendent and concurrent causes, whether flowing from negli-
gence or strict liability, and thereafter apportion fault on a
percentage basis.20 5 The court in Nest-Kart noted that the ap-
portionment calculation calls upon the jury to make a com-
mon sense determination, a function readily performable by
juries.206 In view of the above, the question initially posed can
be readily answered: using its common sense, the jury will as-
sess the degree to which the strictly liable manufacturer, the
negligent employer, and the employee himself caused the em-
ployee's injury.
Finally, there remains the procedural issue of whether a set-
tling party or negligent employer whose liability is settled by
statutory worker's compensation benefits must be joined by
the plaintiff or defendant/manufacturer as a party defendant,
given the fact that neither the settling party nor the employer
will be exposed to liability for damages, contribution, or in-
demnity under the comparative causation approach. Dean
Page Keeton has observed that:
[the] failure to join an alleged settling tortfeasor neither pre-
cludes nor, arguably, should it preclude the submission of the
existence or amount of his negligence. The determination of
the existence or amount of his negligence is in no way depen-
dent on his being a party, and there is no value in making him
a formal party to the litigation except for procedural and tacti-
cal reasons on the part of the claimant or defendants.'
A Texas appellate court in Deal v. Madison0 8 implied that
joinder of the employer is not necessary, as no finding of neg-
ligence in his absence could bind him. Further, we add that
:04 Id. at 330, 579 P.2d at 445, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
06' Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Prod-
ucts Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REv. 723, 725 (1974).
,o6 21 Cal. 3d at 331-32, 579 P.2d at 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
07 Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law - Private Law: Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 14
(1974).
2- 576 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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any fault attributable to the employer has already been satis-
fied by the worker's compensation benefits received by the
employee. Finally, because the purpose of comparative causa-
tion is not to bind the employer, but to determine the third
party's degree of fault, joinder of the employer is absolutely
unnecessary.2 0 9
To illustrate the application of the comparative causation
approach, let us assume that' an air taxi pilot was totally and
permanently disabled in the crash of a twin engine aircraft
owned and operated by his employer. The background of the
crash unfolds as follows: the aircraft was refueled by a fixed
base operator located adjacent to the hanger housing the air
taxi operation. The linemen who refueled the aircraft had pre-
viously sold all of his fuel with the proper octane rating for
the air taxi aircraft's engines. Eager to make another sale, he
intentionally pumped fuel with a lower octane rating than was
specified by the pilot and required for the engines, and billed
the air taxi operation for fuel with the higher rating.
Shortly after takeoff, one engine failed and the second be-
gan to run erratically. The pilot elected to return to the air-
port and had it in sight when the hydraulic pump on the oper-
ating engine failed. As a result, the landing gear could not be
lowered normally. The pilot attempted to execute a missed
approach to gain the time and altitude necessary to lower the
gear manually. On the missed approach, the aircraft was seen
by ground witnesses to roll abruptly in the direction of the
failed engine and crash moments later. On impact, the shoul-
der harness attach fitting pulled loose from its anchor, and as
a result, the pilot's head contacted with the instrument panel
and the glare shield.
The pilot brought suit against the following:
1. The refueler, alleging intentional tortious conduct;
209 Id. at 415. The same result will be reached where the plaintiff/employee is in-
jured, in part, through the fault of multiple third parties, and one settles with the
plaintiff. The jury will calculate the percentage of fault attributable to each party,
whether or not joined, and the liability of the non-settling third party will ultimately
be limited to its share of fault. Thus, through settlement with one of the third par-
ties, the plaintiff may recover a sum greater or less than the percentage of his dam-
ages caused by the settling party.
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2. The facility that overhauled the hydraulic pump two
weeks prior to the crash, alleging it negligently failed to rein-
stall a critical component;
3. The pump manufacturer, alleging it to be strictly liable
on the grounds that the pump could have been designed, at
little additional cost, in a manner that would not have re-
quired the part that was allegedly omitted by the repair facil-
ity; and
4. The aircraft manufacturer, alleging it to be strictly lia-
ble on a crashworthiness theory.
All the defendants alleged that the employee negligently
failed to maintain proper airspeed during the execution of the
missed approach. All defendants brought third party actions
against the pilot's employer alleging that the employer failed
to instruct the pilot properly in emergency procedures. Prior
to trial, the refueler settled the suit with the employee/pilot
for $175,000. Shortly after trial, the pump manufacturer be-
came insolvent. The employee received $50,000 in worker's
compensation benefits210 and at trial the trier of fact deter-
mined the employee's damages were $1,000,000. The fault of
"I0 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4453, 4659 (West Supp. 1981) ($175.00 per week for
the length of the disability); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-404 (1981) ($110.00 per week for
the length of the disability); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(b)(2), (6) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981-82) ($376.33 per week for the length of the disability); IND. CODE ANN. §
22-3-3-10, -22 (Burns Supp. 1981) ($140.00 per week for 500 weeks); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44-510(c), 44-511 (1980) ($170.00 per week for the length of the disability); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 151A § 29, ch. 152 § 34A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981) ($245.48 per week
for life); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 418.351, .355 (West Supp, 1981) ($210.00 per week for
800 weeks); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 176.101(4), 176.011(20) (West Supp. 1981) ($244.00
per week for the length of the disability); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:15-12, 43:21-19 (West
Supp. 1981-82) ($199.00 per week for 450 weeks, subject to possible extension); N.Y.
WORK. CoMp. LAW § 15(6) (McKinney Supp. 1981-82) ($215.00 per week for the
length of the disability); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4123.58, 4123.62 (Page 1980)
($183.33 per week for life); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 501, 582 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82)
($262.00 per week for the length of the disability); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
8306 § 10, 29 (Vernon Supp. 1981) ($133.00 per week for 401 weeks); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 102.11, .43, .44, 102.11, 108.05 (West Supp. 1981-82) ($249.00 per week for
life). Figures were supplied by the worker's compensation commissions in the above
jurisdictions as of February 26, 1981.
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The employee's recovery would be as follows:
Source Amount
Worker's Compensation $ 50,000
Pump overhauler (15% x $1,000,000) 150,000
Pump manufacturer (insolvent) 0
Aircraft manufacturer (25% x $1,000,000) 250,000
Refueler (settlement) 175,000
Total $625,000
As the above figures illustrate, the employee's potential recov-
ery was reduced by his share of the fault, or $50,000. Further,
the worker's compensation benefits were less than the dam-
ages multiplied by the employer's percentage of fault, the for-
mer being $50,000, the latter, $100,000. Similarly, the em-
ployee settled with the refueler for an amount less than the
damages multiplied by the refueler's percentage of fault, the
former being $175,000, the latter $250,000. Finally, the pump
overhauler and the aircraft manufacturer paid their percent-
age shares, and no portion of the pump manufacturer's share
was paid by any other party.
The results are dramatically altered by assuming a rela-
tively low damage award at trial in relation to the worker's
compensation benefits. In the preceding example, assume that
the worker's compensation benefits were $100,000 and the




Pump overhauler (15% x $200,000) 30,000
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Pump manufacturer 0
Aircraft manufacturer (25% x $200,000) 50,000
Refueler 175,00
Total $355,000
Once again, the employee's potential recovery was reduced by
his share of the fault. Unlike the preceeding example, the
worker's compensation benefits greatly exceeded the damages
multiplied by the employer's percentage of fault; the former
being $100,000, the latter, $20,000. In this case, the refueler's
settlement was considerably greater than the damages multi-
plied by the refueler's percentage of fault; the former being
$175,000, the latter, $50,000. Again, the pump overhauler and
the aircraft manufacturer paid only their percentage shares,
and the pump manufacturer paid nothing.
In view of the fact that thirty-six jurisdictions have adopted
some form of comparative negligence or fault, few would argue
that the employee's recovery should not be reduced by the
share of fault attributable to him. Few also would argue that
the worker's compensation benefits may properly be either
more or less than the damages multiplied by the employer's
percentage of fault, because the benefits are fixed by statute
and constitute the expectations of the parties situated in the
worker's compensation system. Similarly, the employee who
settles with the refueler cannot complain if the settlement is
less than the damages multiplied by the refueler's percentage
of fault, because the employee certainly controls the settle-
ment and arguably is best able to assess his own damages."1
Controversy, if any, will likely arise over the fact that the em-
ployee cannot recover the insolvent's share from the solvent
parties. The result, however, is no different from the case
where there is but one defendant, and he is insolvent, or a
case where the employee settles with one party and obtains a
judgment against a non-settling party who becomes insolvent.
.. The non-settling party's liability is reduced by the settling party's percentage of
fault rather than by the amount of settlement. Therefore, plaintiff will be motivated
to settle at or near the value it perceives to be the settling party's percentage share of
fault. Said otherwise, where settlement occurs, it will more likely be made in good
faith and free from collusion between the plaintiff and settling defendant.
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Nevertheless, the employee is never left without a recovery.
He always receives one hundred percent of the worker's com-
pensation benefits even if he is one hundred percent at fault.
From the examples, we can see that the comparative causa-
tion approach works regardless of the cast of characters,
whether employee, employer, strictly liable manufacturer,
negligent party, intentional tortfeasor, solvent, or insolvent.
Each party pays only for his share of the damages; although,
as we have said, the manner in which each party "pays" his
share will differ.
VI. REIMBURSEMENT TO EMPLOYER
Thus far we have considered the distribution of the em-
ployee's loss among all the parties in the worker's compensa-
tion and tort systems. We have not considered a redistribu-
tion of the loss within the worker's compensation system.'
Whether the employer who is less than totally at fault should
be permitted reimbursement for the benefits paid depends,
conceptually, upon one's view of the intersection of the
worker's compensation system with the tort system.1 8 If one
views the bargain struck between the employee and employer
in the worker's compensation system as including the duty of
the employer to provide benefits and the concomitant right of
the employee to retain the benefits, then reimbursement to
the employer is neither required nor allowed. Alternatively, if
one views that equity entitles the employer as well as the em-
ployee to step beyond the boundary of the worker's compen-
sation system and into the tort system, reimbursement of the
employer should be permitted,2 '4 but only to the extent of the
"' This includes the employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier or state
insurance fund.
211 Irrespective of one's view on the desirability of employer reimbursement, many
worker's compensation statutes at present require a return of the benefits to the em-
ployer if the employee recovers from third parties amounts greater than the amount
of the benefits. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3856 (West 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.39
(West 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. cH. 48, § 138.5 (SMITH-HURD SuPP. 1981-82); N.Y. WORK.
Comp. LAW § 29 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307 § 6a
(Vernon Supp. 1980-81); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.29 (West Supp. 1981-82).
" At least there is a certain symmetry achieved in permitting the employer as well
as the employee to cross the worker's compensation boundary into the tort system.
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fault not assigned to the employer, multiplied by the worker's
compensation benefits. Clearly the equitable argument for re-
imbursement becomes more compelling where the employee is
held to have contributed to his injury. Another approach
within the reimbursement alternative is suggested. Rather
than reimburse the employer on the basis of the fault assigned
to the employee and third parties, reimbursement may more
fairly be predicated upon the ratio of the employee's fault to
the employer's fault, multiplied by the worker's compensation
benefit.
Both the second and third formulations necessarily inject
notions of fault back into the no-fault compensation system:
the first, by comparison of the fault of all parties as deter-
mined in the tort system; the second, by the comparison solely
of the fault of the employer and employee, but on the basis of
the fault of each as determined in the tort system. For an il-
lustration of the differences, assume the facts of the first case
in the preceding section. The results in the three approaches
are as follows:
First Approach - No Reimbursement
Tort recovery $575,000
Worker's compensation 50,000
Employee net recovery $625,000





$50,000 x 90% = $45,000
Tort recovery $575,000
Worker's compensation 50,000
Employee gross recovery $625,000
Employer reimbursement 45,000
Employee net recovery $580,000
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Third Approach - Reimbursement Based
Upon Ratio of Employee
Fault to Employer Fault
Ratio of Employee fault to
Employer fault is 5/10% -0.5215
Worker's compensation benefits
multiplied by Employee/Employer
ratio = Employer reimbursement
$50,000 x 0.5 =$25,000
Tort recovery $575,000
Worker's compensation 50,000
Employee gross recovery $625,000
Employer reimbursement 25,000
Employee net recovery $600,000
In each approach, solvent third parties will pay their shares
by settlement 216 or satisfaction of judgment. In the first ap-
proach, the employee retains all of the tort recovery plus the
worker's compensation benefits. In the second and third ap-
proaches, a portion of the worker's compensation benefits is
returned to the employer through the vehicle of the em-
ployee's tort recovery.21 Irrespective of whether the reim-
bursement is described theoretically as contribution or partial
indemnity from third parties or a return to the employer of a
portion of the worker's compensation benefits received by the
employee, the net result of reimbursement is a reduction of
the total net recovery by the employee.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION
We have offered proposals for the judicial handling of the
task of balancing the rights of the employee, employer, and
'1 As is readily apparent, the ratio will produce a number equal to or greater than
"1" where the employee's fault is equal to or greater than the employer's fault. In no
event, however, should "reimbursement" exceed the total worker's compensation
benefits.
"I Obviously, if all parties in the tort system settle, there can be no reimbursement
to the employer in the second and third approaches as there can be no trial to deter-
mine damages and percentage of fault of the parties in both the worker's compensa-
tion and tort systems.
'" If the employer, not joined by the employee, sues a third party, the fault of the
third party, the employer, and the absent employee will be determined on the basis of
comparative causation, but the employer cannot recover more than the worker's com-
pensation benefits it paid.
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third parties. We fully recognize that the boundaries imposed
by statute in some jurisdictions may well constrain some
courts in the implementation of the comparative causation ap-
proach. Specifically, in some jurisdictions, implementation
may be delayed until there are legislative amendments in the
following areas:
1. Joint and several liability;
2. Contributory negligence or comparative negligence
whether so called "forty-nine" (or "fifty-one"), "fifty," or
"pure" type;
3. The characterization of a fellow employee as a third
party;
4. Guaranteed minimum recovery of the employee in a
successful third party suit regardless of an employer's right of
reimbursement;
5. Notice requirement of an employee to the employer of
his settlement with or suit of a third party; and
6. Automatic assignment of an employee's cause of action
to the employer or its subrogee.
The list is by no means exhaustive. Additionally, we recognize
that a full discussion of any topic listed above is beyond the
scope of the article. Nevertheless, implementation of the com-
parative causation approach would require minimal modifica-
tions within the tort system, principally in the contributory
negligence jurisdictions or jurisdictions in which comparative
fault is applied on other than a "pure" basis. The rule of joint
and several liability will not prevent the implementatign of
the approach; rather, the imposition of several, but not joint,
liability will alter the employee's total recovery in the tort sys-
tem in the event of an insolvent defendant. Additionally, the
comparative causation approach can be implemented in con-
cert with existing worker's compensation statutes, although
the present statutes may require, alter, or prevent the redis-
tribution of a portion of a tort recovery within the worker's
compensation system.
We submit that the comparative causation approach equita-
bly handles the problems that exist where the worker's com-
pensation system intersects the tort system, without dis-
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turbing the internal workings of the former. We have,
additionally, proposed two approaches for equitable redistri-
bution of the tort recovery within the worker's compensation
system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The worker's compensation system has grown to maturity
during our century. It guarantees a recovery to the injured
employee even if the employee was totally at fault. It also up-
holds the employer's justified expectations of limited and de-
terminate liability, and we have noted the importance of the
continued affirmance of the employer's expectations. Further,
we have emphasized the inequity that results from the imposi-
tion of liability on a third party in excess of its percentage of
fault. Finally, we have offered proposals for the judicial han-
dling of the task of balancing the rights of the employee, em-
ployer, and third parties where those who are situated in the
worker's compensation system have crossed over into the tort
system, and we have offered suggestions for the redistribution
of a tort recovery within the worker's compensation system.
We fully recognize that a court's implementation of the
comparative causation approach for balancing the rights of all
parties in the worker's compensation and tort systems may
well be constrained by existing statutes. Nevertheless, we be-
lieve that the inequities inherent in the present worker's com-
pensation and tort systems should prompt courts to follow the
innovative path taken by the court in Barron in adopting the
comparative causation approach. We submit that the adop-
tion of the approach would significantly contribute to the
achievement of the ultimate goal of equitable distribution of
loss within the two systems.
